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ABSTRACT. States within the North Central Region of the U.S. differ in their approaches to regulating the
aquaculture industry. According to interest group theory, these policy differences may be attributable to
differences in the abilities of state aquaculture associations to influence state policy makers. The influence
abilities of six aquaculture industry associations were examined in relation to the corresponding state policy
outputs. Influence was defined in terms of each group's relative cohesion, power, and access to policy makers
at both the administrative and legislative levels. Each component was measured separately and subsequently
aggregated to form an overall influence index for each association. State policy outputs were assessed by
means of a matrix analysis which enabled the states to be ranked in order of regulatory control. A moderately
positive relationship was found between association influence and state policy output. Power and access
variables were indicated as the more important determinants of influence. Factors external to the groups
themselves, such as the political and social cultures of the states, also played an important role in aquaculture
association influence upon state-level policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Aquaculture, or fish farming, has seen a surge of
interest during the past two decades. With United States
consumption of fish and seafood continuing to rise while
capture fisheries reach or exceed carrying capacities,
aquaculture provides the means to keep up with an
increasing demand without compromising future supplies.
As a result of the continued expansion and development
of aquaculture in the United States, industry associations
are becoming a highly visible part of the industry. In 1990
there were at least 50 associations serving the industry,
many of them state-level producer organizations (Water
Farming Journal 1990). In addition to the selective benefits
they provide, these associations are the primary organized
group representing the interests of aquaculture producers
in the public policy process.
Regulatory policy has long been a concern of the
industry. For instance, most states in the North Central
Region (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin) do not have a comprehensive
state policy addressing aquaculture as a business. Rather,
these states have relied on a disjointed set of laws and
regulations pertaining to fish and game management,
environmental quality management, health and consumer
protection, and other substantive areas. Previous studies
of aquaculture policies in the United States have identified
the need to make these policies more consistent, with
streamlined permit procedures and clear delineation of
whether or not aquaculture qualifies for the programs and
benefits of traditional agricultural commodities (Bowden
1981; Stickney 1988, 1989; Parker 1989).
Aquaculture, like traditional agriculture, relies on
publicly regulated resources to produce a consumer
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good (Floyd et al. 199D- But unlike agriculture, the
aquaculture industry is emerging during a period of
increasingly stringent environmental regulation. Public policy
goals with respect to water quality, wildlife, and product
safety have a substantial impact on the potential for
aquaculture to develop as a viable sector of the economy.
As a policy area, aquaculture usually does not generate
much public interest. In such substantive areas, interest
groups may dominate the policy process (Kingdon 1984).
To the extent that this is true, one would expect that
differences among state aquaculture policies can be
attributed primarily to differences in the strength of the
vested interests, in this case represented by the state
aquaculture associations. Objectives of the presented
research reflected this expectation and were: 1) to determine
the role that aquaculture associations in the North Central
Region have had in state-level policy making, and 2) to
provide some empirical evidence of interest group influence
at the state level.
Theoretical Framework and Related Research
First advanced by Arthur Bentley (1908), interest group
theory has been given a great deal of attention as the
rationale for governmental decision making. Bentley
maintained that the analysis of groups alone could provide
an explanation of the workings of government. Gaps in
Bentley's theory regarding the causes and effectiveness of
group organization were comprehensively addressed by
Truman (1951), who asserted that groups are formed in
order to advance some common interest. Truman
maintained that group members are attracted and retained
on the basis of this shared interest, and that the achievement
of certain political goals is primary. Latham (1952) further
proposed that politics simply represents a temporary
balance of power among the contending groups at any
given point in time.
The pluralist view stresses the importance of the
cohesiveness of the group as a prerequisite to its
20 INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION INFLUENCE VOL. 93
effectiveness in influencing legislation. Also emphasized
are the group's status and resources, particularly leadership,
that can be applied toward the attainment of the goals of
the group (Truman 1951).
While very little comparative information exists regarding
the influence of interest groups at the state level, some
theorists maintain that the analysis of group characteristics
alone is not sufficient to understand interest group influence
upon policy outcomes. General typologies of interest
groups in state politics have been developed (Zeller 1954,
Zeigler and van Dalen 1976, Morehouse 1981, Zeigler
1983), classifying states according to the strength—strong,
moderate, or weak—of their major pressure groups. The
broad scope of these studies and their emphasis on the
very largest and most influential interest groups make
them most valuable as assessments of the overall political
environment of states rather than as comparisons of
interest groups per se. These pioneering studies, however,
provided a basis for later, more specific analyses of interest
group activity.
For instance, Browne (1985) used the typology
developed by Zeigler and van Dalen (1976) as the basis for
his selection of the four states in which to compare the
behavior and style of lobbyists for aging-based interest
groups (such as the American Association of Retired
Persons). His findings suggested that lobbying must reflect
the particular needs of the state in order to be effective. In
other words, simply utilizing a standard set of techniques
was insufficient. He concluded that interest groups can
only be studied within the context of a given political
culture. Relevant variables in this context include the
strength of interest groups in general, the relative power
of the governor, and the size of state bureaucracies.
Kerin (1986) also studied aging-based interest group
strength across four states. She found that the presence of
an amateur legislature and an active policy subsystem
were among the most important determinants of interest
group strength. Both of these variables are external to the
groups themselves.
Thomas and Hrebenar (1986) also found external
circumstances to be indicative of interest group power in
their study of western state politics. Results suggested that
although good organization, financing, and group status
contributed to interest group effectiveness, "local
circumstances may make one group powerful while it may
be much less effective in another state" (Thomas and
Hrebenar 1986).
The effect of many competing interest groups upon
state policy was examined by Culhane in his study of
western public land use policy (1981). Results indicated
that even at the local administrative level, which is
traditionally thought to be relatively immune to group
influence in this policy area, interest groups had a
significant influence on the policy outputs of public land
management agencies. However, according to Culhane,
an aggregation of group characteristics did not alone
determine group influence. Rather, group activity in
general seemed to be the key characteristic of influence.
This activity was interpreted by Culhane as being the total
number of contacts between agencies and interest groups
about a particular issue.
The proliferation of interest group activity at the state
level results largely from the American federal system with
its many points of access (Zeigler 1965, Morehouse 1981,
Saffell 1984). While business interests tend to dominate
lobbying activity in every state, the substantial cohesion of
the smaller, narrowly focussed groups is emphasized as
being a potentially significant factor in state-level politics
(Zeigler 1965, Saffell 1984). According to Zeigler, a major
factor that determines interest group strength at this level
is the socio-political structure of the state, a theme that has
been substantially borne out in subsequent empirical
research (Browne 1985, Thomas and Hrebenar 1986,
Kerin 1986).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
State regulatory policy was assessed by means of a
matrix which enabled the 12 states in the North Central
Region to be ranked in order of increasing regulatory
control. Aquaculture association influence 'was defined in
terms of each group's relative cohesion, power, and access
to policy makers. Likert scale techniques and telephone
interviews were used to measure these three components,
and scores were subsequently aggregated to form an
influence index for each association.
Measuring State Aquaculture Policy Output
In order to produce a ranking of states on the basis of
a particular policy output—regulations affecting
aquaculture—a method of measuring aquaculture policy
output had to be devised. The difficulties encountered in
creating an appropriate measure of state policy are
enumerated by Lester et al. (1983). Although fiscal measures
of output have been most often employed, there has been
considerable debate as to the appropriateness of monetary
outlays as a measure of policy activity. Lester and others
(1983) used non-fiscal indicators of policy outputs in their
comparison of state-level regulation of hazardous waste.
These measures have also been employed in redistributive
policy evaluations (Fry and Winters 1970, Berry 1979),
assessments of innovations in state policy (Walker 1969,
Gray 1973), and evaluations of statutory structure
(Rosenbaum 1981, Sullivan and Floyd 1991).
A non-fiscal measure of policy output was deemed
appropriate for this study as well. An ordinal classification
matrix was developed (Fig. 1) to rank each state across
several selected categories of regulatory policies. The
chosen categories were permit system, species restrictions,
sales requirements, transportation requirements, import
and export requirements, and record-keeping regulations.
These categories are not all-inclusive, because there are
other relevant areas of regulation. However, many of these
other areas are federally or locally controlled. Thus, the
selected categories represent a cross-section of policies
that permit an ordinal classification of the states in the
North Central Region with respect to state-level aquaculture
policy output. The result of this classification was a set of
ordinal-level data describing the regulatory policy outputs
of the 12 states in the North Central Region.
Six of the North Central states were chosen for
participation in the study on the basis of contrasts in
aquaculture policies. Three states exhibiting a high degree
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FIGURE 1. Ordinal classification matrix comparing relative degree of regulatory control over aquacultural marketing in the North Central Region (adapted
from Thomas et al. 1992).
of regulatory control over aquaculture were analyzed in
comparison with three states having little or no regulatory
constraints. Ohio, Minnesota, and Michigan comprised the
former group, with Kansas, Illinois, and Missouri providing
the contrast. The six corresponding aquaculture associations
that were studied included the Ohio Aquaculture
Association, Minnesota Fish Farmers Association, Michigan
Fish Growers Association, Kansas Commercial Fish Growers
Association, Illinois Aquaculture Association, and Missouri
Fish Farmers Association.
Measuring Aquaculture Association Influence
The three component variables, cohesion, power, and
access, were measured separately and then were
standardized and aggregated to form the independent
variable, association influence.
Groups that present a "united front" will be more
influential than groups that display dissension in the ranks
(Truman 1951). Cohesion was defined for the purpose of
this study as the homogeneity of attitudes and positions
held by the members of a group, enabling them to speak
representatively and convincingly as a group.
A mail survey of aquaculture association members in
each of the six study states provided a measure of
cohesion. A Likert scale was used to solicit member
perceptions of association cohesion, and questions were
adapted from the literature addressing group cohesion
(for example, Enoch 1965, Anderson 1974). Content
validity was established by a panel of experts consisting
of aquaculture research and extension personnel from
several North Central states. Reliability was calculated
using Cronbach's alpha procedure for summated scales
(Cronbach 1951), and a coefficient of 0.86 was obtained.
The reliability coefficient indicates that 86% of the observed
variance in the scores was caused by true variance in the
population as opposed to error variance. Coefficients of
0.80 and above are considered acceptable (Nunnally
1967). Association cohesion scores were calculated by
totaling the median values produced by member responses
to each question.
The second property to be measured was association
power, which is comprised of group resources and
leadership skill. It stands to reason that groups possessing
greater resources and skilled leaders to apply those
resources will be the most influential. In this study, power
was defined as the extent to which a group possesses
certain key resources that were assumed to contribute to
that group's relative ability to influence public policy
formulation and implementation. In addition to
membership, leadership, and financial resources, group
status was also evaluated.
Access was the third property considered in this
study. Even the most cohesive and powerful group
cannot exert its influence unless it develops and
maintains access to political decision makers
(Truman 1951). Access was considered to include
the manner and techniques used by state aquaculture
associations in communicating their concerns to
administrators, legislators, and the general public.
Both power and access were measured via telephone
interviews with key persons within each state aquaculture
association—in most cases this was the association president
or a past president. The power and access components of
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the interview were identical in format. Each question
included five predetermined, coded response categories.
These were ranked in order of increasing power or
access, with the first response category receiving zero
points, the second receiving one point, and so on up to
a maximum of four points. The questions and the rank
order of response categories were derived from the body
of literature on interest group influence (Truman 1951,
Morehouse 1981, Browne 1985, Wootton 1985). Interviews
were conducted so that each question was asked in an
open-answer format with the response coded into the
appropriate category for scoring. Points awarded for
each response were summed for each of the two
components, with the results being that group's power
and access scores.
In addition to the scaled power and access components,
the interviews also included several subjective questions
that were not scored. These served to provide a more in-
depth assessment of the associations and to enhance the
discussion of research results.
While any one of these three properties can contribute
favorably to a group's ability to influence policy outcomes,
it is generally agreed that it is essentially an amalgam of the
three that determines the relative effect of an interest
group's activity (Culhane 1981). Thus, each association's
cohesion, power, and access scores were standardized
and aggregated to form the second major variable,
aquaculture association influence.
RESULTS
Mail Survey Addressing Group Cohesion
Of the 445 aquaculture association members who
received a mail questionnaire, 183 (41%) responded.
Minnesota had the highest rate of response with
47%, and Michigan had the lowest with a 36%
response rate.
Association members were somewhat non-
committal when evaluating their organization's cohesion.
Themajority of association members who responded
perceived their groups to be marginally cohesive.
This is indicated by an overall rating of 65 of a possible
96, or 67.7%. The ratings of individual state
associations in the study population did not deviate
much from the overall, with a low rating of 58.5%
(Michigan Fish Growers) and a high rating of 72.5%
(Kansas Commercial Fish Growers).
One-way analysis of variance was conducted to
determine if the associations were significantly different
from one another with respect to the cohesion variable.
Although a relatively liberal level of significance (alpha =
0.10) was chosen, results indicated that most of the groups
were not significantly different in members' responses to
each item on the questionnaire. Because the six groups
did not represent a random sample, significance testing
was not warranted as a means of controlling sampling
error. However, the achievement of a minimal level of
significance was desirable as an indication of the
importance of the differences found to exist in the study
population. The exception was the Michigan group,
which scored significantly lower than the two highest
scoring groups, Kansas and Ohio.
Telephone Interviews Addressing Group Power
and Access
Association power was broken down into four
categories for analysis: membership resources, leadership
resources, financial resources, and group status. Results
of a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance for the power
variable indicated that the associations were significantly
different at the 0.10 alpha level.
Minnesota Fish Farmers emerged as being the most
powerful of the associations, with the Illinois group a close
second. Large and diverse memberships were important
determinants of power, as were quality of leadership and
the length of time aquaculture groups had been active in
a particular state. Financial resources were not necessarily
important determinants of power—the richer associations
tended to cite financial problems as being more pressing
than did their less endowed counterparts. Relatively small,
young organizations, as characterized by the Michigan
and Ohio groups, were less powerful. However, the Ohio
association possessed strong leadership resources and
could certainly become very powerful over time.
The access variable was divided into three categories
for analysis: access to state-level administrative agencies,
access to the state legislature, and public relations activities
generally believed to facilitate access. Analysis of variance
confirmed that the differences among associations with
respect to access were significant at an alpha level of 0.10.
The Illinois Aquaculture Association emerged as the
group that has sought and maintained the greatest amount
of access relative to the other associations in the study. The
Illinois group's awareness of and use of public relations as
a facilitator was an important determining factor. The
cultivation of good working relationships with legislators
and administrative agency personnel also figured
prominently in the evaluation of association access.
Interestingly, the Missouri Fish Farmers Association,
which scored relatively high for agency access, did not
appear to place the same importance on legislative access
or public relations. The Ohio Aquaculture Association,
which was less than one-year old at the time of the study,
had not yet begun to develop its access. However, the
general level of public support indicated by key contacts
in Ohio is apt to facilitate the association's endeavors.
The Influence-Policy Relationship
An overview has been assembled of the cohesion,
power, and access scores calculated for each aquaculture
association, its standardized values, and values for the
aggregate variable, association influence (Table 1). The
standardized values for each association are those wThich
were used in a correlational analysis of association influence
and state policy.
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were used to
evaluate the relationship between aquaculture association
influence and policy output. Significant correlations are
noted as evidence of their relative importance. Terminology
used in the interpretation of correlation coefficients is
based on Davis (1971).
A moderately positive relationship existed between
association influence and state policy output (Table 2).
The very high degree of correlation between power and
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influence, access and influence, and power and access
suggests a high degree of internal coherence for these
components of the influence model. In other words, as
one component increases, the other tends to increase,
lending validity to a ranking of associations based on the
aggregate variable, association influence.
TABLE 1
Association cohesion, power, access, and influence scores.
Association
Illinois
Minnesota
Kansas
Missouri
Michigan
Ohio
Cohesion
Raw
61.0
64.0
72.5
66.0
58.5
70.5
Mean
Std.
0.64
0.66
0.76
0.69
0.61
0.68
0.67
Components
Power
Raw Std.
33
35
28
24
18
22
0.69
0.73
0.58
0.50
0.38
0.46
0.56
Access
Raw
' Std.
63
56
47
33
44
18
0.72
0.64
0.53
0.38
0.50
0.20
0.50
Association
Influence"
2.05
2.03
1.87
1.57
1.49
1.34
1.73
"Association influence scores are an aggregate of the standardized values
for cohesion, power, and access.
TABLE 2
Correlation matrix for the impact of aquaculture association
influence upon state policy output.
Variables
Cohesion
Power
Access
Influence
Output
Cohesion
1.0000
0.0857
-0.3714
-0.2000
0.0290
Power
1.0000
0.7714*
0.8857*
0.1160
Variables
Access
1.0000
0.9429*
0.2029
Influence
1.0000
0.3769
Output
1.0000
contribute favorably toward a group's ability to influence
policy. However, there are other factors, external to the
group itself, that ultimately determine the amount of
influence a particular interest group can have upon state
policy outputs.
When studying interest group influence across several
states, the use of regulatory policies as the dependent
variable may be misleading. States differ in the detail in
which laws and codes are written and in the extent to
which written laws and codes are implemented and
enforced. These basic differences in detail and
implementation may outweigh any differences that could
be attributed to differences among the interest groups
addressed by this research .
Both Minnesota and Missouri illustrated this limitation
well. Rankings of the six states with respect to aggregate
scores indicating overall aquaculture association influence
and overall state policy output show that Minnesota
placed highly in terms of association influence (Table 3).
Yet Minnesota is one of the most stringently regulated
states. Conversely, Missouri, with its relatively less influential
association, was ranked first in terms of policy output.
TABLE 3
Comparison of state rankings on both the independent
and dependent variables.
Aquaculture Association
Influence" State Policy Output'1
1. Illinois
2. Minnesota
3. Kansas
4. Missouri
5. Michigan
6. Ohio
1. Missouri
2. Illinois (tie)
2. Kansas (tie)
4. Michigan
5. Minnesota
6. Ohio
*Denotes coefficients significant at alpha = 0.05.
"Ranking based on scores given in Table 1.
bRanking based on scores given in Fig. 1.
Note, however, the negligible to moderately inverse relation-
ship between group cohesion and the other four variables.
Upon a cursory analysis, it would appear that cohesion was
not a necessary factor in aquaculture associations' abilities to
influence policy. In fact, it appears that the less cohesive
organizations tended to have the most access and influence.
However, the differences among associations were not very
important for this variable. With the exception of the highest
and lowest scoring associations, the ranking of scores used
in the correlations was essentially a random ordering. Thus,
it was not possible to evaluate the effect of cohesion upon
interest group influence or policy output based on the
results obtained from the six studied associations.
DISCUSSION
External Factors Affecting Aquaculture Association
Influence
The findings of this study are consistent with those of
previous tests of interest group influence at the state level.
Intrinsic properties such as power and access tend to
These anomalies may be a reflection of the different
approaches taken by Minnesota and Missouri writh respect
to natural resource policy in general. Minnesota has
passed a comprehensive aquaculture development act
(Minnesota 1989), and thereby has achieved a goal of
many aquaculture producers. However, Minnesota laws
and regulations are written in detail and are very explicit,
covering a multitude of fisheries-related activities.
Consequently, this greater specificity kept the state's policy
output from being ranked higher in relation to other states.
On the other hand, Missouri laws and regulations are
very broad and generally worded. They do not address
many of the categories measured, and therefore Missouri
ranks highly in terms of state policy output. Consequently,
the Missouri association has veiy little reason to develop
its influence. Evidence of this was provided in the intervie ws
with Missouri contacts. Of the six associations in the study,
only Missouri had no specific priorities for their group and
had virtually no political agenda.
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Differences among group influence could also result
from the functional nature of the influence-policy relationship.
Intuitively, it seems that the relationship would be a causal
one—that influence would tend to cause a policy effect.
However, it is just as likely that a group's influence is
determined, at least in part, by the status of the policy itself.
The Missouri association was not very influential because it
did not have to be. The Minnesota association, on the other
hand, had developed a great deal of influence relative to the
other groups in the study. According to association
respondents, the constraining nature of the Minnesota
regulatory environment necessitated it.
"Windows of opportunity" to initiate or change laws or
regulations sometimes come about as a result of favorable
political circumstances (Kingdon 1984). Some aquaculture
policies have been formulated after policy windows have
opened. For instance, the comprehensive Illinois
Aquaculture Development Act of 1987 (Illinois 1989) was
established as a result of that state's actively seeking out
alternative agricultural products. It has been suggested
that the law probably could not be enacted today because
other concerns have taken over the agenda (S. Waite, Past
President, Illinois Aquaculture Association, personal
interview 1991). Examples of other policy windows might
result from a change in administration or a change in the
regional- or state-level interest on locally farmed fish. An
aquaculture association's ability to recognize and act upon
changes in the social, economic, or political climate may
be the key to aquaculture policy formulation in the North
Central Region and elsewhere.
Determinants of Aquaculture Association
Influence
Some specific determinants of association influence
emerged from this study. Interestingly, these were
distributed fairly evenly across the components of power
and access. One of the identified components of power,
financial resources, did not appear to be related to group
influence. This finding is of some importance because lack
of funds is usually thought to be a limiting factor in
achieving political influence. Research results provided
very little evidence about the effect of cohesion upon
group influence because the studied associations did not
differ significantly with regard to this variable.
Aquaculture associations with large and diverse
memberships were more influential than small, producer-
only groups. The encouragement and retention of non-
producer members, such as researchers, government
administrators, and industry suppliers, served to widen
the scope of aquaculture policy issues beyond the narrowly
focussed concerns of a small group of producers. While
diversification of members may seem to be easily achieved,
some of the interviewed group leaders stated that the
organizations are reluctant to broaden their membership
for fear of compromising the interests of members who
are producers.
Also important is a strong, politically active core of
members. There seems to be an anomaly concerning
political action in that the groups' goals, according to key
leaders, were primarily political, yet the reasons given for
membership were inevitably "technical assistance" or
"business contacts," with "political action" being secondary.
If an aquaculture association is in fact interested in
influencing the formulation of aquaculture policies, a
number of members must be committed to this goal.
Leaders who brought education, experience, and
contacts to the organization contributed substantially to
group power. In the associations studied, leaders ranged
from a "whoever gets stuck with it" situation to leaders
having advanced degrees in related fields such as fisheries
biology. Educated and experienced officers are likely to
be perceived as having a broad perspective; consequently,
their positions stand to be given more credibility. Leader
affiliations with national fisheries and agricultural
associations also tend to increase a group's credibility, and
this in turn could contribute to association power.
Aquaculture association status is enhanced via longevity,
or how long aquaculture interests have been active in a
state. Group longevity ranged from less than one year
(Ohio) to more than 27 years (Kansas), but age of the
groups was not necessarily a direct indication of status.
Status can also be increased through a group's affiliation
with other, more established, interest groups. For instance,
four of the six associations in the study were in some way
connected with the Farm Bureau. Public perception offish
farming is also a major factor in attaining status as a group.
Whereas the Kansas association had existed for quite
some time, support for aquaculture was seen as being
somewhat lacking, possibly because of the strong
identification with traditional agriculture in that state.
Conversely, the Ohio Aquaculture Association, while less
than one year old, stands to benefit from the considerable
public support for aquaculture that was indicated by key
leaders in that group.
Access to administrative decision makers is particularly
important because of the many policies that are formulated
at this level. A good working relationship between aquaculture
interests and state agencies that regulate the aquaculture
industry is fundamental. This has been facilitated in Minnesota,
Missouri, Illinois, and Kansas by the creation of an aquaculture
advisory council or task force. This entity, which is separate
from the association, provides a forum for both sides to
discuss issues and to resolve conflicts on a regular basis. By
generally discussing issues as they pertain to the industry as
a whole, it is likely that fewer confrontations involving
specific producers will result.
A program of technical assistance, either formally
implemented through state policy or informally practiced,
is characteristic of those states where associations have
effective relationships with administrative agencies. Missouri
in particular has a successful technical assistance program,
with that state's Department of Conservation even assisting
with the association's annual convention. Sporadic,
problem-oriented contact with administrative agencies
was characteristic of states (Kansas, for instance) with a
more adversarial association-agency relationship.
An important determinant of successful access at the
legislative level seemed to center upon the individuals
targeted for access. Associations that had directed their
efforts toward highly influential legislators and, in some
cases, even toward the governor's office, were more
successful than associations that had limited their contacts
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to legislators from particular districts. Obviously, the
amount of influence gained by enlisting the support of a
legislator is limited to the amount of influence that
individual is capable of exerting. By seeking out the most
influential leaders in the legislative and executive branches,
some aquaculture associations have made tremendous
progress in getting their concerns on the political agenda.
This was the case in both Illinois and Minnesota, the two
states that have passed aquaculture development acts.
Less influential officials may be enthusiastically supportive
but lacking in the seniority necessary to initiate and build
support for a policy.
Appropriate public relations activities were the most
overlooked route toward increased influence among the
associations in the study. Only the Illinois association
considered public relations to be one of its ongoing
functions. Others, such as the Minnesota association, cited
occasional public relations activities or only had sporadic
media attention. For the most part, however, associations
in the study did not take advantage of this vital enhancer
of access.
The fundamental importance of expanding an issue in
scope, visibility, and intensity has been stressed by Cobb
and Elder (1983), pioneers in the study of agenda setting.
Aquaculture issues directly affect only a limited number of
people and, as a consequence, decision makers stand to
lose very little by neglecting those issues in favor of greater
ones. A well-planned and implemented public relations
campaign can serve to expand aquaculture issues to a
larger public, make those issues more visible, and increase
the chances of getting them placed on agendas of the
legislative and executive branches.
Summary and Implications
The purpose of this research was to explain the
disparities among North Central states' aquaculture policies
in terms of observed differences in the abilities of
aquaculture interests to influence state-level policy. Based
on the interest group literature, a method of measuring
relative interest group influence was devised. Results
were subsequently correlated with measures of state
policy output, and a moderately positive relationship
was observed.
The first objective of the present study was to determine
the role that aquaculture associations have had in state-
level policy making. While not generalizable, findings
indicate that these groups do have at least some role in the
formulation and implementation of policies that affect
them. The overall political environment of the state, the
stringency with which laws and codes are formulated and
implemented, was at least as important in determining
policy outputs as the strength of the group itself.
Aquaculture associations seeking to increase their
influence upon state policy need to take into consideration
the primary determinants of influence—membership,
leadership, status, administrative and legislative access,
and public relations—and develop these in their
organizations. At the same time, the associations can work
toward opening policy windows. This can be accomplished
via public relations efforts, by taking advantage of political
campaigns and administrative turnover, and by simply
being prepared to act quickly when the opportunity
presents itself.
As a case study, aquaculture policy serves to expand
interest group theory beyond the customary big business
groups, labor unions, and others that can potentially
dominate the policy process. Aquaculture policy, by
contrast, exemplifies those areas of public policy that
affect, and interest, a very small and specific segment
of the population. Yet our findings generally support
those of previous research. This seems to indicate that
the components of influence—group characteristics as
well as external political and cultural factors—remain
relatively constant in relation to interest groups of
variable strength and constituency.
It would be useful to replicate this study in another
policy area, using stronger or more diverse interest
groups. The utilization of a random sample of state
associations within a particular area of concern would be
extremely valuable in increasing the external validity of
these types of studies. Modifications in the measurement
of both influence and policy output will certainly come
about as a result of further inquiry and must eventually
result in a more or less standardized view of these
constructs. Until this is achieved, comparisons of the
findings of one study relative to another will not be as valid
or meaningful as they might be.
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